Showing posts with label attractor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label attractor. Show all posts

09 September 2025

3 Becoming Semiotic: The Social Origins of Differentiated Construal

Preface: Toward Contingent Construal

In earlier series, we explored how the activity of individual organisms becomes coordinated within a social system — first through value-guided behaviour, then through routinised symbolic acts. We saw how a foraging bee’s perceptual categorisation can contribute to the colony’s viability, and how, through structured enactment, a behaviour like the waggle dance can come to stand for something absent.

Now we shift focus. Rather than symbolic acts that stabilise over time, we ask: when does a semiotic behaviour become dynamically contingent? When do organisms begin to shape meaning in the moment — modulating their actions not just in response to the world, but in response to one another, in ways that cannot be pre-specified?

To approach this question, we draw on Halliday’s notion of microfunctions — early communicative functions loosely glossed as regulating, requesting, interacting, and expressing. These are not tied to human grammar, nor to language as such. Instead, they offer a lens through which we can explore how contingent meaning-making might emerge in other species — where behavioural flexibility, role-switching, and social dependency create pressure for interactional alignment beyond routine.

This is not yet the story of language. It is the story of how meaning begins to move — not only as a stable form, but as a socially negotiated act.


1 When Routine Is Not Enough

A routinised semiotic system can be remarkably effective. The waggle dance of the honeybee enables one individual’s foraging experience to shape the behaviour of others — through a patterned, interpretable performance that has stabilised across generations. It is not improvised or invented; it is enacted. Its success lies in its reliability.

But not all social environments support this kind of stability. In species where individuals form fluid associations, where roles shift, alliances form and dissolve, or threats emerge unpredictably, routinised behaviours can fall short. In such settings, organisms must respond not just to general patterns, but to specific configurations of others, here and now. And sometimes, what matters must be made to matter — to another individual, in the moment.

This is the threshold where contingent construal becomes adaptive. Rather than enacting a fixed mapping, the individual must shape a construal that suits the situation — not as a private mental act, but as a public semiotic performance: a gesture, a call, a posture, a pattern of movement that modulates how another individual perceives and responds.

The evolutionary pressures that give rise to such systems are not mysterious. They appear where:

  • individuals must coordinate in ways that cannot be routinised,

  • social outcomes depend on negotiated interaction,

  • and organisms benefit from the ability to influence others’ behaviour flexibly.

Here, the emergence of microfunctions becomes plausible — not as fully formed linguistic roles, but as interactional tendencies grounded in value-based need. A demand for food, a move to regulate another’s behaviour, a call to interact, or a gesture of personal stance — these are not arbitrary categories. They are ways of acting with and on others, shaped by the pressures of contingent social life.

To trace this emergence, we need not imagine a leap from signal to syntax. We begin instead with what a flexible, socially situated organism must do: regulate others, seek assistance, express internal state, establish mutual orientation. These are functions of construal, enacted in real time, not yet grammatical, but already semiotic.

What emerges is not a fixed code, but a field of patterned responsiveness — constrained not by convention alone, but by the dynamics of shared embodiment, mutual relevance, and ongoing coordination. Where routine ends, contingent construal begins.


2 Microfunctions as Pressures on Meaning

If a behaviour is to be shaped in the moment, it must be shaped for someone. Meaning does not emerge in a vacuum. It arises under pressure — from needs that cannot be met alone, from actions that must be coordinated, from relations that must be navigated in real time. These pressures are not linguistic, but social. And they can be grouped, not arbitrarily, but functionally.

Michael Halliday, observing the earliest forms of communication in young children, identified several microfunctions — basic purposes that communicative acts serve before the development of grammar. These included the instrumental (I want), regulatory (Do as I say), interactional (Me and you), and personal (Here I come). While drawn from human ontogeny, these functions do not require language to exist. They point to something more general: core functions of contingent social coordination.

We can treat these not as stages of development, but as functional attractors: tendencies that emerge wherever social systems require individuals to modulate one another’s behaviour in context-sensitive ways. In this light, the microfunctions become pressures on meaning — each a kind of problem that contingent construal helps to solve.

  • The instrumental function emerges when one organism seeks to access something through another — not just through effort, but through influence.

  • The regulatory function appears when one organism attempts to constrain or redirect another’s behaviour.

  • The interactional function supports affiliation — establishing, maintaining, or repairing social bonds in situations of mutual presence.

  • The personal function allows an organism to project internal state or orientation — making stances visible that would otherwise remain inaccessible.

These are not speculative abstractions. They are grounded in the concrete needs of social coordination, especially in species where roles are flexible, cooperation is non-obligatory, or outcomes depend on subtle alignment. And they help explain why some communicative systems move beyond routine — because routine cannot satisfy these pressures on its own.

Each microfunction creates a semiotic demand: for a behaviour that is shaped with respect to another’s response. This demand introduces variability — not random, but constrained by value, embodiment, and the history of interaction. The result is a space of emergent construals — not yet language, but no longer mere behaviour.

What we begin to see is a shift from stability to adaptability, from fixed mappings to situated modulation. And in this shift, the groundwork is laid for systems that are both contingent and semiotic — systems in which what is done constrains what is meant.


3 Contingency and Feedback

A construal only succeeds if it makes a difference. This does not mean it must be understood in the abstract. It means it must shape another’s behaviour in a way that aligns with the constraints under which it was produced. In a system where routine is not enough, contingent construal must be taken up — acted on, replied to, reinforced, or resisted.

This introduces a new kind of feedback loop. In routinised systems like the waggle dance, alignment is achieved through stable form: shared structure leads to predictable uptake. But in systems of contingent construal, alignment is not guaranteed. It is negotiated in real time — through interactional feedback, where one organism's construal modulates another's behaviour, and that behaviour in turn reshapes the field of construal.

This loop is not metacognitive. It does not require awareness, representation, or symbolic intention. It requires only that:

  • construals are sensitive to the presence of others,

  • responses are shaped by the form of the construal, and

  • further construals are modulated by the outcome of that interaction.

In such a system, forms can begin to stabilise — not into fixed codes, but into attractors of behaviour. A gesture that succeeds in regulating another’s action becomes more likely to be repeated. A vocalisation that brings social contact may come to index affiliation. A display that fails to produce its intended alignment may be abandoned, reshaped, or withheld.

This process is not learning in the usual sense. It is interactionally entrained variation: a system in which constrained novelty is reinforced or eroded by its consequences for coordination. In this context, microfunctions become not just pressures, but fields of selection: zones of social tension in which only certain construals succeed.

The result is a semiotic ecology — not a symbolic code, but a space of mutually shaped responsiveness, in which behaviour and construal co-evolve. Meanings are not transmitted, but enacted and taken up. And through this ongoing loop of production, response, and adjustment, contingent semiotic systems begin to take form.

What emerges is a dynamic repertoire: forms that are shaped in the moment, yet constrained by prior patterns of success; meanings that are not fixed, but functionally sufficient; and social alignments that depend not on fixed roles, but on shared participation in an unfolding field of relevance.

This is the groundwork of flexible meaning. Not yet grammar, not yet language — but already a system in which construal becomes something more than behaviour: an act shaped with regard to another’s uptake.


4 From Contingency to Differentiation

Contingent construal begins as situated response. A gesture, a vocalisation, a shift in posture — shaped by context, directed at another, modulated by immediate relevance. But over time, certain forms begin to settle. They succeed, not because they are fixed, but because they are flexible in the right ways — interpretable across contexts, adaptable in deployment, recognisable in uptake.

This is the beginning of differentiation. What starts as fluid variation begins to partition. One form tends to occur in acts of demand; another in acts of regulation; another in affiliative exchanges. These patterns are not arbitrary. They are shaped by the functional pressures that gave rise to the microfunctions themselves — pressures for influence, coordination, and alignment.

As forms differentiate, they also generalise. A gesture that once regulated access to food may come to regulate movement, turn-taking, or distance. A sound that once solicited help may be extended to other forms of request. What matters is not the original association, but the functional relation between construal and consequence.

Differentiation and generalisation are not stages. They are dynamics within a constrained system. They mark a shift from meaning-in-the-moment to repertoires of patterned construal — structured enough to support interpretation, flexible enough to adapt to new interactional demands.

Crucially, these repertoires remain semiotic, not symbolic in the linguistic sense. They do not rely on syntax or explicit reference. But they do exhibit:

  • Functional differentiation: different forms associated with different kinds of semiotic work.

  • Contextual flexibility: capacity to be reshaped, redirected, or recombined across situations.

  • Interactive uptake: responses shaped not just by form, but by recognised function.

At this point, the system begins to support alignment across difference. Individuals need not share the same experience or role. They need only share a history of mutual constraint — a social ecology in which construal and interpretation co-evolve.

This is not the emergence of language. But it is a major step toward it. A semiotic system has formed in which meanings are not only enacted, but differentiated by use — where the form of a construal tells us not what something is, but what kind of act it is doing in the social field.

What began as a gesture becomes an act of stance. What began as a sound becomes an act of regulation. Meaning is no longer emergent with every act; it is now enacted through a system — a system shaped by the pressures of social life, constrained by embodiment, and grounded in the shared activity of response.


Epilogue: A System Poised for Symbolic Form

We began with a question: when does routine fall short? From there, we traced a path through the emergence of contingent construal — behaviour shaped not only by internal value, but by the need to coordinate flexibly with others. Along this path, we encountered functional pressures: to influence, to align, to connect, to assert. These became sites of meaning — not as representations, but as acts that made a difference in real time.

Through interactional feedback, these acts stabilised. Not into fixed codes, but into structured tendencies — repertoires of form shaped by what they tended to do. Over time, these tendencies differentiated: one form for regulation, another for demand, another for stance. They began to generalise: from specific acts to functional classes, from immediate context to broader interactional fields.

This is not yet language. But it is no longer merely behaviour. It is a semiotic system: contingent, embodied, responsive, and functionally differentiated. Meaning here is not fixed, but it is systemic — shaped by histories of interaction, by the pressures of social life, and by the affordances of a shared ecology.

From here, many paths are possible. A system like this might remain fluid, ephemeral, deeply embedded in immediate context. Or it might, under further pressure, begin to stabilise new kinds of structure: patterned combinations, more abstract construals, forms whose meaning depends on their relation to others.

But those are questions for another time.

For now, we have traced how, from the basic pressures of value-guided coordination, a system can emerge in which construal becomes flexible, form becomes differentiated, and meaning becomes collective — not because of words, but because of what it takes to live, act, and align with others when routine is not enough.

28 August 2025

Theorising the Speed of Light: Constraint, Relation, and the Horizon of Meaning

1 Light as Boundary – From Signalling to Spacetime

In physical theory, the speed of light is a limit — a constant, a horizon, a threshold beyond which no information can pass. But in our relational ontology, we ask not just what light is, but how it constrains meaning.

We begin not with light as a substance or wave or particle, but as a condition for relation.

The Speed of Light as Semiotic Constraint

From the perspective of construal, speed is not simply how fast something moves. It is a relational meaning — the rate at which difference is propagated. And the speed of light is not just a high number: it is the maximum rate at which difference can be communicated between sites of potential instantiation.

In this sense, the speed of light is a semiotic threshold.

It constrains what can be construed together — what can be co-instantiated in a single perspective. Just as two words must co-occur within a clause to relate syntactically, two events must fall within the light-cone of a perspective to relate physically.

This is the first insight:

Light is not a medium; it is a limit on co-instantiation.

From Signalling to Relation

We often think of light as a signal — something sent from one point to another. But this presumes a system in which such signals are possible. In relational terms, signalling is a kind of meaning-making, a way of coordinating construal across distance and delay.

And every act of signalling is governed by constraint: how quickly a signal can arrive, how it transforms in transmission, whether it can be coherently construed at the other end.

Light sets the outer boundary for that coherence.

No signal — no meaningful relation — can travel faster than light.
This is not a technical inconvenience; it is a constitutive constraint.
It defines what counts as a relation across space and time.

Thus:

Spacetime itself is structured by the constraints of meaningful signalling.

Constraint as the Ground of System

If we step back, we see a pattern.

In language, grammatical constraints make meaning possible:
You cannot combine “run” and “quickly” at random — their co-selection is structured by system.

In physics, the constraints on signalling likewise shape what can be construed together.

And this gives us the general principle that grounds this series:

Constraint is not the enemy of freedom — it is the condition for relation.

Light, in this model, functions not as a carrier of truth but as a boundary of meaning — a horizon beyond which co-instantiation is no longer possible, and thus perspective loses coherence.


In the next post, we’ll explore how light not only bounds relation but structures delay — and how velocity and distance themselves are construed semiotically as relational meanings within a spacetime system.


2 Relational Distance – Meaning in Velocity and Delay

In the previous post, we construed the speed of light not as a physical quantity but as a semiotic boundary — the outer constraint on co-instantiation. It marks the limit at which processes can meaningfully relate across spacetime.

In this post, we move deeper:
What is distance in this model? What is velocity?
And what does it mean that delay is intrinsic to relation?

We begin by rethinking the nature of spatial and temporal separation — not as objective measurements, but as perspectival meanings within a relational system.


Distance Is Not Separation — It Is Delay

In everyday thought, distance separates things. It creates gaps.
But in a relational ontology, separation is not an absence — it is a meaningful delay in relation.

When a star flares 10 light-years away, we say it “happened long ago.”
But from our perspective, that delay is the relation: the process construes itself through light received today.

The event is not separate from us; it is differently located in our field of relation.

Thus, distance is not a thing between things.
It is a meaning construed through constraints on simultaneity.

Distance is delay rendered meaningful by the limits of signalling.


Velocity as Relational Change

In this same light, velocity is not the movement of a thing through space.
It is the rate of differentiation across relation — the speed at which a process becomes differently related to a point of reference.

When we say a car is moving at 60 km/h, we are describing how rapidly its spatial relation to our chosen origin is changing.
This is not a brute fact — it is a construal of unfolding under constraint.

And the constraint that makes velocity intelligible — and possible — is light.

Because nothing can relate faster than light, velocity becomes the measure of how far a process can change in a given frame before relation breaks down.

In other words:

Velocity is a measure of relational coherence across time.

It is how we track systemic differentiation under the constraint of delay.


Frames of Reference as Perspectives

The notion of a “frame of reference” is central to relativity.
But what is it in semiotic terms?

A frame of reference is not an objective point in space.
It is a position within a system of unfolding meanings — a site from which difference is construed.

Different observers are not different because of their location, but because of their construal:
Each occupies a unique trajectory through the field of relation.

This means that:

  • Simultaneity is not absolute.

  • Velocity is relative to perspective.

  • Causality is shaped by frame.

These are not distortions of a deeper truth — they are the truths of a relational universe.

All construal is perspectival — and velocity is construal in motion.


Delay as Meaningful Tension

Finally, we return to delay.

Delay is not friction.
It is the spacing that makes meaning possible.

In language, pause is not empty — it structures rhythm, contrast, anticipation.
In physics, delay does the same: it conditions which events can relate and how coherence is maintained.

Without delay, there would be no orientation, no causality, no spacetime.

Thus:

Delay is not an obstacle to meaning. It is meaning's grammar.


In the next post, we turn to one of the deepest implications of this perspectival construal:
How frames of reference themselves become meanings — and how the observer is not an external witness, but a participant in the field of relation.


3 Frames of Reference and the Observer

We’ve reimagined light as a semiotic constraint and velocity as relational change. Now we deepen the perspective:
If distance is delay, and velocity is orientation through unfolding, then what is a frame of reference?
And who — or what — is the observer?

This post explores how meaning arises from within a system — not from outside.
A frame of reference is not merely where we stand.
It is how we mean.


Frames of Reference Are Sites of Construal

In physics, a frame of reference is a coordinate system: a set of axes from which motion is measured.

In our ontology, that coordinate system is a metaphor for meaning.

A frame of reference is:

  • A structured site of relation.

  • A perspective from which differentiation is construed.

  • A grammar for tracking unfolding.

It is not a point in space.
It is a position in a semiotic system — an orientation within a field of potential relations.

This means:

There is no frame without meaning, and no meaning without a frame.


Every Observer Is Inside the System

Classical physics imagined an external observer: someone who looks at the world from outside.

But relativity — and our ontology — denies this.

There is no “outside” to the field of relation.

Every observer is:

  • A participant in the system.

  • A site where relational potential is instantiated.

  • A cut in the field — not a mirror of it.

Observation is not about watching. It is about meaning from within.

The observer is not separate from the observed.
The frame of reference co-defines what is seen.


Construal is Constitutive

This leads us to a powerful shift.

Observation is not passive.
It brings into being the frame through which relation unfolds.

In semiotic terms:

  • A clause construes a process through the perspective of a participant.

  • A speaker construes meaning through a chosen metafunctional alignment.

  • A physicist construes a world by adopting a reference frame and measuring within it.

Each construal is a theory of relation.

And each theory determines what can be instantiated as meaning.


The Observer as Construal-in-Process

From this angle, an observer is not a thing.
It is a moment of construal: a configuration of meanings instantiated from systemic potential.

This means:

  • A reference frame is not chosen arbitrarily; it emerges from a history of construal.

  • The “speed of light” is the semiotic ceiling within which such construal can remain coherent.

  • The difference between “motion” and “rest” is not absolute — it is perspectival.

So:

The observer is not a noun. It is a clause: an unfolding relation.


Perspective Shapes Potential

Because every observer occupies a frame of reference, and every frame is a theory of meaning,
it follows that:
the construal of one event changes the field for future construals.

This is how spacetime evolves.
This is why systems of reference don’t just record meaning — they structure it.

We live in a universe of reference frames — not as fixed scaffolds, but as semiotic attractors, each shaping what can come next.


In the next post, we push this logic to the horizon:
What happens when construal itself reaches its limit?
We turn to simultaneity, causality, and the semiotic paradoxes they bring — a prelude to the black hole as the collapse of meaning.


4 Simultaneity and the Tension of Meaning

Having grounded speed and distance in relation, and reframed observers as perspectival sites of construal, we now encounter one of the deepest tensions in physics — and in meaning itself:
Simultaneity.

What does it mean for two things to happen at the same time?
And what does it mean for that claim to differ depending on your frame of reference?

In our relational ontology, these questions reveal a profound insight:
Simultaneity is not a property of events.
It is a tension in the construal of relation.


The Problem of Simultaneity

In classical physics, time was assumed to flow uniformly — the same everywhere.

But relativity shattered this assumption.
It showed that:

  • Events that are simultaneous in one frame may not be in another.

  • There is no universal “now.”

  • Even temporal order can reverse, depending on motion and location.

This isn’t a trick of perception.
It is a structural feature of relational systems.

And it forces us to abandon any idea of absolute timing.


Simultaneity Is a Meaning Relation

In our model, time is not a container.
It is a relation among unfolding processes.

So simultaneity isn’t when two things “really” happen at once.
It’s when two events are construed as co-instantiating — as meaningfully aligned in a frame of reference.

This means:

  • Simultaneity is a choice in the construal of difference.

  • Like theme and rheme, or actor and goal, its meaning depends on system.

  • It expresses a relation, not a clock.

Simultaneity is where perspective meets constraint.


Tension as Meaningful Disagreement

Different frames disagree on simultaneity.
But that disagreement isn’t a failure.
It’s a semiotic tension — a divergence of construals within a system of possibility.

Like polyphony in music or ambiguity in language, this tension is not an error.
It is what makes complex meaning possible.

And that tension is held open by light — by the delay that relation requires.

Without delay, no relation.
Without relation, no construal.
Without construal, no simultaneity.


The Horizon of Causality

Simultaneity also touches causality.
If different frames disagree on what came first, can we still say one thing caused another?

Yes — but only if we reconstrue causality.

In our ontology:

  • Causality is not a chain of external events.

  • It is a system of meaning — a construal of how one unfolding constrains another.

Relativity limits causal construal to what can be linked within a light cone — i.e., within communicable delay.
This limit is not arbitrary.
It is what makes causal meaning coherent.

So:

Causality is a semiotic structure that depends on constrained difference.


Simultaneity and the Cut

At its core, simultaneity confronts us with the cut between system and instance:

  • The system allows multiple construals of time.

  • Each instance selects a frame — and that selection excludes others.

This is not a defect. It is the logic of instantiation.
To construe at all is to cut a path through potential.

Simultaneity is where the universe stretches its grammar to the edge.
And light is the punctuation that keeps it readable.


In the next post, we move to a paradox that cannot be resolved within any frame:
the black hole — where construal collapses, and the system’s horizon becomes absolute.
We’ll explore how the grammar of relation reaches its event-boundary.


5 Black Holes and the Collapse of Construal

If construal is the patterned unfolding of relation —
If light is the limit that keeps construal coherent —
Then what happens when even light can’t escape?

We reach a boundary not just of space or time,
But of perspective itself.

This is the black hole:
Not a “thing” but a collapse in the system’s ability to differentiate.
A semantic singularity where construal breaks down.


What Is a Black Hole?

In physics, a black hole is a region of spacetime so warped that nothing — not even light — can escape its gravity.

But in relational terms, this means:

  • No light means no signalling.

  • No signalling means no relation.

  • No relation means no construal.

From outside, we see only the event horizon:
The point beyond which no information returns.
The cut becomes impassable.

The black hole is where difference becomes invisible —
Where the system can no longer construe the instance.


Meaning Requires Distinction

All construal is differentiation:

  • This from that.

  • Now from then.

  • Here from elsewhere.

But if no light escapes, no distinction can be made.
The interior of the black hole becomes uninstantiable —
Not because nothing is there, but because nothing can be construed.

From the system’s point of view,

The black hole is not silence —
It is unspeakable.


The Compression of Perspective

As matter approaches the event horizon, its perceived time slows.
From an external frame, it freezes at the edge —
An asymptotic approach to invisibility.

This is not just a gravitational effect.
It is a semiotic compression:

  • The event continues to unfold internally.

  • But from outside, construal loses traction.

  • The sign collapses under its own constraint.

This is the limit of logogenesis —
Where the grammar of unfolding meaning hits its vanishing point.


Inside the Horizon

What lies beyond?

From within, the system still unfolds.
Potential still constrains instance.
But no new construal is possible from without.

This gives us a crucial insight:

The black hole is not the absence of meaning.
It is meaning that has been cut off from relation.

This is the deep paradox:

  • Relation creates the conditions for meaning.

  • But extreme relation (gravity, mass, curvature) can also erase it — by collapsing all construal into singularity.

The system folds in on itself.


A Limit Case of Perspective

Black holes do not destroy meaning.
They reveal its limit.

  • They show that perspective is not optional.

  • That relation is constrained by delay.

  • That construal requires openness.

They are where the universe says:
This far, and no further.

The event horizon is not just a physical threshold.
It is a grammatical one — the boundary of what can be meant.


In the next post, we step back from the brink.

If black holes are where construal breaks down,
then what lies on the other end of the scale?

We return to the beginning — not as a moment in time,
but as a structured field of potential:

The Big Bang, re-read as theory:
The system pole of the universe.


6 The Universe as Theory: Reading the Big Bang as Meaning Potential

If black holes mark the collapse of construal — where relation becomes unintelligible — then what lies at the opposite end of the scale?

We return not to a “beginning in time,” but to the beginning of time as theory.

To the Big Bang — not as a bang, not as a singularity, not even as an event — but as a semiotic construct:
the system pole of the universe,
the most abstract construal of potentiality from which all unfolding becomes possible.


Not a Moment, but a Model

In the standard story of cosmology, the Big Bang is framed as the origin of everything: time, space, matter, causality.

But in a relational ontology, what comes first is not what happens, but what constrains what happens.

The Big Bang, in this sense, is not the first instance — it is the structured field of potential from which instances can arise.

It is theory, not event.

It is the most abstract system that makes relation possible — not a moment that occurred, but a model we construct to ground all occurrence.


The Big Bang as System Pole

System and instance are not separate realms. They are complementary perspectives on the same unfolding.

To perceive a text is to perceive it as an instance of a system.

To perceive a particle is to construe it as an instance of a quantum field.

To perceive the universe is to construe it as an instance of… what?

The Big Bang, in this reading, is the theory of the universe — its grounding semiotic system, the most abstract construal of what it is possible to be.

Not the first thing that happened, but the necessary condition for anything to happen.

It is not the zero point of time.
It is the zero point of relation.


Meaning Requires Boundary

Without constraint, nothing can unfold meaningfully.

The Big Bang is the limit of differentiation — the maximal compression of potential. It functions, semiotically, like a deep origin clause: not “this happened,” but “from this, all else becomes possible.”

It is the ultimate system boundary — not in scale or scope, but in orientation.

It gives directionality to expansion, a default for time, a baseline for entropy. But all of this unfolds from within a construal — from a particular relation to the system as potential.

The Big Bang marks the edge of theory, just as the event horizon marks the edge of instance.


Cosmology as Meaning-Making

When physicists theorise the Big Bang, they are not discovering a primordial object.

They are construing a theory of instance — a way of modelling how the system as a whole constrains what can be.

Like all systems, it is built from instances — from background radiation, redshifts, particle ratios. And yet, it stands above them, as an organising construal.

This is not metaphysics. It is semiotics: the attempt to systematise the conditions of meaning at cosmic scale.

The Big Bang, read this way, is a human theory about what it means for the universe to have a meaning.


From Beginning to Becoming

The power of this construal is not that it explains a singular moment, but that it opens a space in which all further moments can unfold.

It gives coherence to the grammar of spacetime.

It constrains what counts as a cause, a signal, a structure.

And it grounds our most fundamental orientations — to time, to matter, to possibility — in a shared field of relation.


Coda: Theory as Universe

In this light, the universe is not a fixed collection of things, nor even a set of processes.

It is a meaning system, continuously updated through unfolding instance.

And the Big Bang is its system pole — the construal of ultimate potential, from which all differentiation arises.

To theorise the Big Bang is not to look back in time.
It is to stand at the edge of meaning, and trace the grammar of what it means to be.


7 The Cut Between Theory and Event

Light and the Differentiation of Meaning

Throughout this series, we’ve traced a consistent insight: that the speed of light is not just a number in physics, but a semiotic constraint—a boundary that allows relation, constructs distance, enacts simultaneity, and frames experience.

Now we arrive at the final consequence:

The speed of light marks the cut between theory and event.

It is the condition for meaning to arise as difference: between here and there, before and after, potential and instance.


Constraint as the Condition for Differentiation

In our relational ontology, constraint does not block meaning—it makes meaning possible.
Without systemic constraint, there would be no differentiation, no structure, no relation—no way to distinguish anything from anything else.

Light-speed is one such constraint:

  • It limits what can be co-instantiated, creating delay.

  • It prevents absolute simultaneity, enforcing perspective.

  • It conditions the unfolding of events, structuring spacetime itself.

In this way, light becomes the semiotic horizon:

A boundary that both enables and limits what can be construed as meaning.


Theory and Event as Complementary Perspectives

We have repeatedly drawn on the distinction between systemic potential and instance.

  • Theory construes the range of what can happen.

  • Event is what happens, construed as an instance of that potential.

In this model:

  • The potential is a theory of the event.

  • The event is a perspectival cut through that theory.

This is the relation between system and instance, Range and Medium, potential and selection.

And in physical theory, the same applies:

  • The wavefunction is a theory of potential.

  • The particle trace is an event.

  • The physicist's construal of this event is already shaped by the speed-of-light constraint.

Light marks the boundary of co-instantiation—the point at which potential resolves into an instance, a cut is made, and construal becomes possible.


The Universe Makes Meaning Through Cuts

This “cut” is not a problem to be solved—it is how the universe theorises itself.

Every construal—every instance of meaning—depends on such a cut:

  • A selection from what could have been said.

  • A perspective within what could have been seen.

  • A differentiation from what could have been meant.

To make meaning is to mark a boundary within a field of potential.
To theorise is to construe those boundaries as system.

The speed of light is such a boundary—not just for physics, but for perspective itself.


The Light Between Us

Even here—across time and space—this post reaches you through a delay.
Not instantaneously, not from nowhere, but within a system of constraint:
light, time, media, memory, construal.

And it is that delay, that structured difference, that allows this to be meaningful.

This is not a failure of immediacy.
It is the condition for relation.


A Final Reflection

Meaning is not found in what is.
It is made in what could have been—and what, through perspective, was selected.

The speed of light is not merely a constant in a field equation.
It is the horizon of meaning:

  • a limit that enables difference,

  • a relation that constructs distance,

  • a delay that makes meaning possible.

To theorise light is to theorise meaning.
To reach the horizon is to make the cut.