Preface: When Does a Behaviour Mean Something?
In the previous series, we traced how value-guided behaviour in bees gives rise to complex patterns of coordination. We explored how perceptual categorisation, behavioural routinisation, and distributed regulation allow the colony to function as a self-organising system — without meaning in any symbolic sense.
Now we take a further step. We ask: when does a behaviour begin not only to regulate, but to construe? When does an act performed in the present come to stand for something absent — not through instinct or imitation, but through a structured enactment that can be recognised and responded to by others?
The waggle dance of the honeybee offers a compelling case. Through it, a forager re-enacts the flight to a food source — not by transporting nectar, but by compressing her experience into a patterned movement. The dance symbolises both perceptual dimensions (distance, direction) and value dimensions (richness of the source). And crucially, it can be interpreted by others.
In this series, we explore how such symbolic enactment emerges. We do not begin with meaning, but with the dynamics of constrained behaviour — with the routinisation, modulation, and coupling of value systems. From there, we examine how certain forms of behaviour come to function not merely as action, but as construal — a performance that stands for something beyond itself.
We remain with the bees. There is no need to invoke language, consciousness, or representation. The colony offers a different model: one in which meaning, in a minimal sense, emerges from the structured interplay of routine, perception, and social alignment.
This is the story of how symbolic form can emerge from value-guided life.
1 The Dance as Enactment of Experience
The waggle dance does not deliver food. It does not transport nectar, lead a convoy, or enact a plan. What it does is more remarkable: it re-enacts a past flight — and in doing so, enables future ones.
A forager returns to the hive after locating a productive food source. She moves through the crowd of her sisters, climbs onto the comb, and begins a patterned movement: a run forward while waggling her abdomen, a loop back, a return. She repeats this sequence, again and again, varying the angle of the waggle run and the duration of its vibration.
What is being enacted here is not the act of feeding, but the act of flying — compressed into a symbolically structured movement. The angle of the waggle run relative to gravity represents the angle of the food source relative to the sun. The duration of the waggle phase indicates distance. The intensity and repetition of the dance correlate with the richness of the find.
This is not mimicry. It is not a literal re-performance of the flight, nor is it the emission of a signal in the narrow sense. It is a constrained, routinised enactment — one whose form has stabilised across generations and whose structure is interpretable by others.
In this way, the waggle dance becomes more than behaviour. It becomes a performance that stands in for something absent — a past event that matters. The bee does not describe her flight, nor point to its endpoint. She enacts a construal of it: a structured mapping that others can read.
Here, we see a critical threshold: a shift from action that affects others to action that construes a shared world. It is not that the forager knows she is informing. Rather, the structure of the dance has evolved to embody a constrained relation between experience and action — one that recruits other bees into a pattern of behaviour aligned with the original experience.
The dance, then, is not a message but an enactment — a systemic compression of movement, distance, orientation, and value. It is behaviour become construal, grounded not in words, but in shared embodiment, constrained repetition, and the coupling of value-guided systems.
2 Compression and Construal
To dance is not to explain. And yet, in the waggle dance, something is compressed and conveyed — not through symbols in the linguistic sense, but through the structure of movement itself. What is compressed is experience: a flight across time and space, reduced to a pattern of orientation, vibration, and repetition.
The forager does not replay her journey in miniature. She enacts a mapping: the angle of the waggle run corresponds to the bearing of the food source relative to the sun; its duration compresses the length of the journey; its intensity encodes the relative value of what was found. In this way, the bee transforms a temporally extended, sensorimotor activity into a constrained behavioural sequence.
This transformation is only possible because the colony has evolved to interpret it. Other bees, attuned to the structure of the dance, are able to adjust their own orientation and flight accordingly. They are not deciphering a code, but responding to a patterned construal — a performance that aligns their action with a past event they did not witness.
The dance thus becomes a site of symbolic enactment. It is not merely a cause of behaviour, but a form that constrains the interpretation of experience. It allows one bee’s perception to shape another’s action, not through mimicry or contagion, but through a structured evocation — a choreography that stands for a relation.
This is compression in a technical sense. Information about space, time, and value is made actionable through reduction — through the distillation of a complex trajectory into a gestural form. It is not the content of the flight that matters, but its relational structure: how far, in what direction, and with what worth.
And this is construal: not the expression of internal states, but the enactment of a constrained relation between what was experienced and what can now be done. The dance is not about the flight. It is the flight — in symbolic form, enacted for others to extend.
Through this act of compression and construal, we begin to see how behaviour crosses a threshold. It ceases to be merely effective and becomes, in a minimal but crucial sense, meaningful — not because of mental states or conscious intent, but because of the structure it imposes on shared action.
In the waggle dance, the colony does not just act together. It sees together — not with eyes, but with alignment to an enacted, shared construal of the world beyond the hive.
3 Entrainment and Interpretability
The waggle dance is not a one-sided performance. For the symbolic enactment to function, it must be both enacted and entrained — produced by one bee and interpretable by others. This interpretability does not arise from shared mental models or learned codes, but from the structured tuning of perception and response within the colony.
Worker bees do not study the dance. They do not need to reconstruct the flight in abstract terms. Instead, they are physiologically and behaviourally attuned to the form of the dance itself: its orientation, duration, intensity. This attunement is not fixed by instinct alone, but shaped through developmental history, environmental regularities, and evolutionary pressure.
In this sense, the interpretability of the dance is not imposed from without. It emerges from the coupling of perception and action systems under constraint. The bees' perceptual systems are organised to treat this behavioural form as salient — not because they know what it means, but because their action systems are modulated by it in reliable, reproductively successful ways.
This is entrainment. The structure of one organism’s behaviour brings another into synchrony — not in the form of mimicry, but through the shaping of readiness. When a bee watches the dance, she is not decoding. She is being brought into alignment: her attention orienting, her action potentials shifting, her readiness taking form.
Interpretability, then, is not a property of the message alone. It is a function of the system — of the stable, shared dynamics between what is enacted and what is responded to. The dance constrains what the forager does, but also what the observers are likely to do. It exists as a structure of coupling.
Crucially, this system is not arbitrary. It is grounded in the shared biology of the colony, in the common conditions of flight and foraging, and in the evolutionary pressures that favour reliable alignment. The waggle dance succeeds because it compresses what matters in a way that can be enacted, perceived, and extended.
Interpretation, in this context, is not a mental event. It is a regulatory effect — a restructuring of behaviour in response to a structured enactment. What makes the dance semiotic is not the presence of representation, but the emergence of a system in which construal and response co-evolve, stabilising a form of symbolic action within a field of shared constraint.
4 The Semiotic Threshold
What makes the waggle dance more than an adaptive routine? What lifts it from the category of routinised behaviour into the domain of the semiotic? To answer this, we must be careful not to import the assumptions of language or representation. Instead, we look to the structure of the system itself — to the conditions under which behaviour becomes symbolic enactment.
Three features mark the dance as crossing this threshold.
First, the dance enacts a construal of an absent experience. It is not simply a behavioural response to current stimuli, but a performance anchored in a prior event — a flight that has ended. The dance compresses and reconfigures that event, so that it can guide the future behaviour of others. The event is not reproduced, but construed — enacted in a new medium.
Second, the construal integrates perceptual and value dimensions. It is not only the direction and distance that are encoded, but the desirability of the source — the evaluation of its worth. The symbolic form thus binds together what was perceived and what mattered, offering a compressed enactment of both.
Third, the performance is interpretable by others in a consistent, structured way. This interpretability does not rely on cognition or decoding, but on the shared coupling of perception and action systems. The form of the dance is constrained enough to be aligned with action, and flexible enough to adapt to variation. It functions not just because it is done, but because it can be taken up.
These features together mark a shift. The dance no longer simply modulates the colony's behaviour; it creates a construal space within which past experience, current performance, and future response are coordinated.
This is the semiotic threshold: not a moment of intention or reflection, but the emergence of a form of behaviour that functions as a symbolic act — an act that enables a shared relation to what is not present, through a structure that is neither innate nor arbitrary, but evolved and constrained.
The waggle dance, in this light, is not a message sent from one mind to another. It is a symbolic enactment grounded in value-guided action, embodied routine, and the coupling of attuned systems. It stands not for a thing, but for a relation — between experience, action, and response.
And in doing so, it invites us to see meaning not as something humans add to the world, but as something that can emerge, in rudimentary form, wherever life finds a way to act together on what is no longer there.
Conclusion: Behaviour that Stands for More Than Itself
Across this series, we have followed a single behaviour — the waggle dance — from its roots in value-guided action to its function as symbolic construal. We have seen how it emerges not from deliberation or internal representation, but from the stabilisation of movement, perception, and value in a colony that depends on shared orientation to the world beyond the hive.
The waggle dance does not transmit information in the abstract. It enacts a patterned relation between a past experience and a present opportunity for collective action. Its form is constrained enough to be interpreted, yet flexible enough to adapt to the conditions that matter: direction, distance, richness.
In this way, the dance reveals a threshold — a minimal form of semiosis, rooted not in words or thought, but in embodied, value-responsive life. It is not communication in the human sense, nor a precursor to language. It is something else: a relational achievement of a colony attuned to what matters, and able to act together on what is no longer there.
By attending carefully to this form, we begin to see how meaning — in its most basic, emergent form — need not begin with us. It may begin wherever structure, responsiveness, and the coupling of systems allow behaviour to stand for more than itself.
And in the dance of the bees, that threshold comes vividly into view.