02 July 2025

Music in Relational Ontology: Sound, Value, and the Unfolding of Consciousness

1 Music as Social Phenomena: A Relational Model

Music moves us. It brings tears, delight, energy, or calm. But what exactly is it that moves us? This series offers a model of music grounded in relational ontology — one that begins not with what music means, but with what music does.

Music as Material and Social

Music is not a message. It is not a symbolic system that encodes and transmits meaning between minds. Rather, it is a material phenomenon — a pattern of sound — that functions socially by activating values in others. A music maker generates sound, and that sound has the potential to resonate within a listener’s consciousness, selecting from that listener’s system of perceptual categorisations and affective dispositions.

In these terms, music is not semiotic, because it does not rely on the symbolic abstraction of meaning. But it is social, because it acts upon systems of value within social bodies — like laughter, birdsong, or the colours of a peacock’s tail.

Relational Ontology: Sound in Context

In the model developed here, we take seriously the implications of a relational ontology: nothing exists in isolation, and no phenomenon is defined independently of the relations in which it participates. Sounds are not just events in physical space. They are phenomena — not in the sense of universal percepts, but as instances of potential actualised in and through relations. These relations include the listener’s body, memory, attention, and social and cultural context.

Time, too, is understood relationally: not as a container or a measure, but as the unfolding of processes. Sound unfolds in time, and so does consciousness. Music arises when these unfoldings come into resonance — when the movement of sound selects a movement of value in the listener.

Music Maker and Music Listener

A key distinction in this model is between the music maker and the music listener.

  • The music maker instantiates material potential: sound patterns in time.

  • The music listener actualises value: a response of feeling, attention, and perhaps memory.

This is not a communication between minds, but an encounter between phenomena and consciousness. The social function of music lies in its power to recruit shared systems of value — just as the scent of ripened fruit might draw animals, or a ritual chant might synchronise a group.

From Sound to Social Force

This approach allows us to understand music not as a symbolic message to be interpreted, but as a social force that acts through its capacity to resonate. A piece of music can stir a crowd, offer solace, coordinate movement, or bind people together. But it does this not by conveying meanings, but by selecting and activating values in those who listen.

This distinction is crucial. The value awakened in the listener is not put there by the music. Rather, the music selects it from a system already formed through embodied experience and social life.


In Part 2, we will turn more closely to the materiality of sound itself — how physical patterns of vibration participate in the unfolding of processes, and how these are taken up within the body of the listener.


2 The Sound of Process: Materiality, Time, and Resonance

If music is not a symbolic message but a material phenomenon that functions socially, then what kind of material phenomenon is it? What kind of matter is sound? And how does this matter come to matter — how does it exert social force?

To answer these questions, we turn to sound as processual materiality: something that unfolds through time and in relation.

Sound as Unfolding

In a relational ontology, time is not a container in which things happen. Time is the unfolding of processes. A sound does not occur in time; it is time — the time of its unfolding. This makes sound a particularly vivid example of what it means for a phenomenon to exist as relation.

A single tone is not an object but a movement of air. A rhythm is not a set of points in time but a patterned trajectory. Harmony, timbre, phrasing — all are forms of unfolding, inseparable from the processes that actualise them in material and perceptual space.

When we say that music “unfolds in time,” we are describing a relational process: sound and consciousness co-arising, each affecting the other.

From Vibration to Value

Sound begins as vibration — compressions and rarefactions of air. But its social function begins only when those vibrations are taken up in a body — when a listening body hears not only frequencies, but qualities. A sound is not merely detected; it is felt. This feeling is shaped by the body’s histories, habits, and perceptual structures — many of which are shared across individuals, cultures, or species.

This makes music a phenomenon that acts through resonance: the matching of movement in one domain (sound) with movement in another (consciousness). Resonance is not mere mimicry. It is relational selection: a process in which the unfolding of sound brings forth — activates — a corresponding unfolding of affect, attention, or action in the listener.

This is how music begins to function socially. Not through meaning, but through value: by selecting what matters from a body’s system of dispositions.

No Symbols, No Codes

There are no messages in music. There are no codes to be deciphered. What there is, instead, is a shared field of attunement. The listener is not interpreting the music; they are responding to it — through the actualisation of patterned affect.

This patterning does not require shared symbols, but it often recruits shared histories. A genre, a style, a groove — these are not semiotic systems, but sedimented forms of valueful relation. They shape what kinds of resonance are possible. They make social coordination and collective affect possible.


In Part 3, we explore how these shared resonances give rise to musical ecologies — distributed systems of sound, value, and social relation that link music makers and listeners in a common unfolding.


3 Shared Soundworlds: Musical Ecologies and Social Bodies

If music is a material phenomenon that functions socially by activating values in listeners, then its social power lies not in communication, but in co-ordination. Not in saying something, but in sounding with others.

In this post, we explore how music gives rise to musical ecologies — distributed networks of relations among bodies, sounds, values, and histories. These ecologies link music makers and music listeners in overlapping fields of attunement.

From Individual Bodies to Social Bodies

When a listener hears music, they are not merely decoding structure; they are enacting a bodily response to patterned sound. This response is shaped by evolutionary dispositions, cultural practices, and individual history — all of which reside not only in the brain, but in the whole body as a social, biological, and physical system.

Music resonates with this bodily system. But because bodies are never simply individual — they are born, shaped, and sustained through social relation — the affective resonance of music draws listeners into shared experience. When this happens, the body of the listener becomes part of a social body, even if no words are exchanged.

A crowd dancing, a choir singing, a mother humming to her child: these are not symbolic transactions. They are mutual enactments of patterned resonance — what we might call valueful synchrony.

Ecologies of Sound and Value

These resonant synchronies do not emerge from nowhere. They depend on shared conditions: cultural practices, acoustic environments, habits of attention, and historical repertoires of feeling. Together, these form musical ecologies — patterned arrangements of material and social potential that support the emergence of resonance.

Such ecologies are not reducible to music makers or music listeners. They are relational fields in which music happens — not as an object, but as an event of unfolding relation.

And they are never static. As music makers generate sound — instantiating particular material forms — and as listeners respond — actualising particular affective patterns — the ecology shifts. New resonances are formed, new values are selected. The ecology evolves.

Music as Social Force

Because music unfolds in relation, it can bring into being new social possibilities. It can recruit attention, shape collective movement, generate belonging, and mobilise affect. It does this not by representing a shared world, but by co-producing one — through the coordinated resonance of bodies in time.

In this sense, music does not describe a world. It instantiates one. It draws together music maker and music listener into a shared soundworld — a momentary, material, social constellation.


In Part 4, we explore how this resonance is not only social, but emotional — how music moves us by actualising affective potential in patterned and powerful ways.


4 Feeling With: Affective Resonance and Emotional Force

In previous posts, we described music as a material phenomenon that functions socially by activating values in listeners. This post turns to the affective dimension of that activation: how music feels.

We propose that music’s force lies not in what it means, but in what it moves — in how it resonates with affective patterns of value. Music does not represent emotion; it actualises emotional potential in patterned and relational ways.

The Feeling of Form

When a listener hears music, they encounter changes in pitch, rhythm, loudness, texture, and timbre. These are not just acoustic features; they are perceptual forces that the body registers as tensions, releases, intensities, and reliefs.

These patterned forces map onto — or better, activate — bodily capacities for feeling. Rising pitch may activate anticipatory tension. A sudden silence may evoke surprise. Repetition may comfort; dissonance may disturb. These effects are not symbolic. They are affective responses to material form.

But these responses are not fixed. They are shaped by cultural, developmental, and situational factors. The same sound may elicit different feelings in different contexts. Still, in all cases, the emotional response is actualised from the listener’s own affective potential, triggered by the form of the music, in relation.

Emotional Patterning Without Emotional Content

Music often feels expressive — joyful, mournful, agitated, serene. Yet music does not express these states in the way a person might verbally articulate emotion. It does not refer to emotion. Instead, it produces affective resonances that align with emotional experience.

This is an important distinction. Music does not contain emotion, nor does it communicate it from music maker to music listener. Rather, it brings about patterns of feeling that can be co-experienced across listeners. This shared resonance allows listeners to feel with others — even when listening alone.

In this sense, music’s emotional power lies in its capacity to coordinate affect across time and bodies — not to label or describe emotion, but to synchronise it.

Force Without Message

Music thus exerts emotional force without message. It does not need to “say” anything to move us. Its power lies in the dynamics of unfolding — of tension and release, repetition and variation, continuation and rupture — which our bodies experience as emotional events.

These affective dynamics unfold in time, not as a ticking clock, but as processual time: the lived time of shifting states and relational change. Music resonates with this temporality, drawing listeners into patterns of affective unfolding that are as much embodied as they are auditory.


In Part 5, we turn directly to the question of meaning. If music is so powerful, why does it not count as a semiotic system? What kind of significance does it carry, and how should we understand that significance in relation to meaning?


5 Significance Without Symbol: Why Music Isn’t a Language

Music is often said to be a “language,” or to “communicate,” or to “express meaning.” These metaphors are widespread and intuitively appealing — and yet, they can obscure more than they reveal. If we’re to understand how music functions in our relational model, we need to be precise: music is not a semiotic system. It does not create or convey meaning by symbolic means. Its power lies elsewhere.

In a semiotic system like language, meaning is structured paradigmatically. Speakers make choices from meaning systems — for instance, choosing the word cat instead of dog, or jump instead of crawl — and those choices are what make the expression meaningful. The paradigmatic axis is central to how meaning is organised and interpreted: the value of any given word depends on the range of alternatives that could have been chosen instead.

In music, there are certainly choices — choices of pitch, rhythm, timbre, tempo, texture, and more. These are often richly structured, both culturally and historically. But they are not choices in meaning. They are not symbolic selections that stand in opposition to other meanings. Rather, they are material selections: choices of sound, not choices of signification. A composer might choose to resolve a phrase with a major triad rather than a suspended fourth, but that choice does not produce a different meaning in the linguistic sense — it produces a different sonic effect that will resonate differently with listeners.

This is an important distinction. While music has paradigmatic choices in its material resources — selections from a repertoire of available sounds — it does not have paradigmatic choices in systems of symbolic meaning. These choices affect how the sounds are experienced, but not what they mean, because they don’t mean anything symbolically. Music is not an underdetermined form of language; it is a different kind of system altogether.

The effects of music — its sense of significance, its emotional resonance, its social force — arise not from symbolic content but from the relational interplay between the material phenomena produced by the music maker and the perceptual value systems activated in the music listener. The process is dynamic, embodied, and affective, but not semiotic. The listener doesn’t interpret a message; they participate in an unfolding of sound that resonates with the unfolding of their own consciousness.

In that sense, music is not meaningful, but it is significant. It brings things to matter. It shapes how bodies feel, how time flows, how values take form — not through messages, but through presence, rhythm, energy, and movement. And that, in our relational model, is more than enough.


In our final post, we explore the implications of this model for identity and memory. If music doesn’t mean, how does it come to matter so deeply to the self?


6 Echoes of the Self: Music, Memory, and Individuation

Music stays with us. A childhood lullaby, a song from a first dance, an anthem of protest — such sounds are etched into experience with uncanny vividness. If music does not mean, how does it come to matter so much to the self?

This final post considers how music contributes to individuation: the development of a unique, situated consciousness within a social field. Without being semiotic, music still participates in shaping identity, memory, and the unfolding of the self.

Music as an Attractor in the Flow of Time

In our relational ontology, time is not a container, but the unfolding of processes. Consciousness is one such process. It does not sit behind experience but is shaped through it.

Music, too, unfolds in time. But more than that, it provides attractors for consciousness — recurring structures of sound that invite us to attend, entrain, and return. The listener’s own unfolding becomes rhythmically and emotionally co-organised with the unfolding of the music.

Over time, such co-unfoldings become part of the history of the self. They anchor moments of intensity, episodes of relational meaning, or shifts in our sense of what matters.

Memory Without Meaning

Because music is not semiotic, it does not carry memories as messages. It carries them as resonance.

A few bars of melody may trigger embodied responses, emotional surges, or sudden recollection. These are not acts of interpretation, but of activation: the re-emergence of prior value-laden experience prompted by similar sonic contours.

This is memory without representation. Music does not remind us by saying “remember,” but by feeling us back into an earlier configuration of self-in-world.

Music and the Social Shaping of the Self

Individuation is not isolation. We become ourselves through our position within social systems of value. Music plays a central role in this, not because it expresses who we are, but because it selects what we respond to.

Tastes, scenes, and subcultures — all structured by musical value — contribute to the formation of identity. We hear ourselves through others' sounds, and we find affinity with others who resonate to the same patterns. Music draws boundaries not by expressing meanings but by activating shared valuations.

In this way, music contributes not to the symbolic construction of the self, but to the social activation of the self as a value-sensitive, relational body.


Conclusion

We have argued throughout this series that music is not a semiotic system. It does not construe the world symbolically, but instead unfolds as phenomena that activate patterns of social value in listeners.

This is not a lesser role. On the contrary, music’s capacity to shape attention, affect, memory, and identity — all without message or meaning — reveals a powerful domain of social functionality beyond semiosis.

Music does not speak. It does not say. It resonates. And in doing so, it helps shape the rhythms of living, the pulse of community, and the echoing self.


Coda — Listening Again: A Reflection on Music, Consciousness, and Social Value

This series has offered a view of music grounded not in message but in resonance — not in meaning, but in value. We’ve proposed a model in which the music maker instantiates material phenomena — patterns of sound — and the music listener, through embodied perception and shared social experience, values them. These phenomena do not express the inner life of the maker in symbolic terms, but they resonate with the listener’s own unfolding of consciousness, selecting from perceptual systems shaped by biology, culture, and history. It is through this resonance that music functions socially.

Throughout, we’ve avoided the temptation to classify music as a semiotic system, resisting the pressure to read music as if it were language. Instead, we’ve treated it as a material phenomenon within a social ecology, whose functioning is better understood in terms of value rather than meaning. The distinction is subtle but crucial. To call music meaningful risks importing assumptions of symbolic reference. To call it valuable foregrounds its role in selecting and reinforcing perceptual preferences, emotional dispositions, and social attunements.

In this way, we have been careful to preserve the full dimensionality of a relational ontology. Time, in this view, is not a backdrop for musical events, but the very dimension in which they unfold — and in which listening unfolds, too. Music and consciousness meet in time, process to process. Their resonance is not metaphorical. It is structural.

There are, of course, limits to any model. Music exceeds classification; it surprises us, shapes us, and follows us into memory. But the value of a model lies not in its closure, but in its capacity to guide new attention. If this one helps us listen more deeply — not only to music, but to how we relate, how we feel, how we attune to one another — then it has done enough.

And if, in the background, you hear the echo of a soundworld not yet named — a value still unfolding — then the model has done more than enough. It has begun to listen back.

01 July 2025

The Projected Self: Consciousness Rewritten in Relation

1 Consciousness Is Not What You Think

What is consciousness? Western traditions have often pictured it as a light inside the mind, an inner eye surveying the world from a private theatre. From Descartes' cogito to the computational mind of cognitive science, consciousness has been cast as a thing — something that resides in us, that we possess, that acts as the origin of meaning.

But what if this picture is backwards?

This series proposes a reorientation: that consciousness is not the origin of meaning, but an instance of it — not an inner substance, but a semiotic unfolding. Rather than something we have, consciousness is something that happens: a relational phase in the movement of meaning potential across strata, speakers, and systems.

Consciousness is not what you think — and not where you think it is.

This is not a metaphor. It is a shift in ontology. Instead of treating the self as a bounded subject who produces thoughts, we treat the self as a semiotic position that emerges from the interplay of signs. The "I" is not the source of meaning but its temporary centre of gravity — a node in a relational network of meaning-making.

We draw on a relational ontology informed by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which understands language not as a conduit for thoughts, but as the very architecture that makes thought possible. In this model, consciousness is:

  • Relational: It arises through semiotic relations, not in isolation.

  • Stratified: It unfolds across different levels of language (semantics, grammar, phonology).

  • Instantiated: It is not a fixed entity but an event — a moment of actualisation from potential.

To say that the self is "semiotic all the way down" is not to deny its reality, but to reconstrue it. We are not peeling away layers to find an inner core; we are following threads in a relational fabric. And what we find is not an essence, but a pattern — one that is always in the making.

In the parts to come, we will explore:

  • How projection, stratification, and instantiation shape the architecture of consciousness.

  • How meaning unfolds not in the mind alone, but in the relation between potential and instance, self and other.

  • How rewriting consciousness requires rewriting the ontological assumptions that have shaped our thinking for centuries.

We are not theorising about consciousness from the outside. We are inhabiting it differently — from within a system that is always already relational.


2 Projection, Stratification, and the Architecture of Experience

If consciousness is not a substance within us, but a phase in the unfolding of meaning, how does it come to feel so immediate — so real? The answer lies in how language organises experience through projection, stratification, and instantiation.

Projection: Consciousness in Transit

In Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), projection refers to the linguistic mechanism by which one clause is made to represent another — as in she thought he was late. This is not just grammar reporting thoughts; it is grammar enacting them.

To think is to project: to represent meaning as meaning.

Projection models consciousness as a relation between semiotic instances — one clause standing in for another, one layer of experience doubling as another. Far from being a mirror of inner life, projection constructs that innerness as a semiotic effect. Consciousness, then, is not the origin of projected meaning but the outcome of projection itself.

Stratification: The Semiotic Planes of Experience

Stratification refers to the layered architecture of language: meanings (semantics) are realised by wordings (lexicogrammar), which are realised by soundings or scriptings (phonology/graphology). These are not just technical distinctions — they define how meaning is formed.

Consciousness emerges not at a single level, but across strata.

To become aware of something is to move across these planes: from potential to meaning, from meaning to wording, from wording to form. Thought is not confined to a single level but arises in the relation between them — in the semiotic tension that makes meaning perceivable.

When we speak of "inner speech" or "the voice in the head," we are invoking these strata at work: grammar silently enacting a semantic episode, internally projected and potentially actualised. The so-called "inner world" is just language folding back on itself.

Instantiation: From Potential to Presence

Every act of meaning is an instance — a momentary actualisation of a broader system. Instantiation is the process by which meaning potential becomes meaning instance. Consciousness, in this light, is not the totality of a self but the immediate instance of its semiotic system in action.

This is why consciousness feels temporal, fleeting, and ungraspable — because it is. It is the instantial tip of a semiotic iceberg, a phase in a system whose full potential always exceeds what is actualised.

Consciousness is not the full field of being, but a vector within it — the trajectory of meaning becoming actual in time.

In sum, the architecture of experience is not built from the inside out, but from the relational operations of language. Projection gives us a structure for representing thought. Stratification gives us the layers through which it is realised. Instantiation gives us the pulse of presence — the moment when meaning takes form.

This is not a deflation of consciousness. It is a reconfiguration: to see consciousness not as a container of thought, but as the flow of meaning between planes, systems, and selves.


3 No Mind Without Meaning — No Meaning Without Relation

We have now seen that consciousness does not emerge from a hidden interior, but from semiotic processes — from projection, stratification, and instantiation. In this part, we take the claim further: not only is there no mind without meaning, but no meaning without relation.

The Self as Semiotic Effect

In traditional metaphysics, the self is often imagined as the stable centre of experience — a thinker behind the thought. But in our relational ontology, there is no "self" prior to the systems that make it possible. What we call self is the emergent effect of relations: between meaning potentials, between speakers, and between semiotic strata.

The self is not the source of meaning, but a position within meaning systems — a semiotic locus where relations converge.

In SFL terms, this self emerges through instantiation and individuation. Instantiation is the relation between the system of meaning potential and the actual meaning instance. Individuation is the relation between the collective meaning potential of a culture and the specialised meaning potential of a particular person.

Consciousness emerges as the ongoing interplay of these two: the individual's unique trajectory through meaning systems, shaped by what they have meant before, and constrained by what the culture makes possible to mean now.

Meaning as Always Already Relational

There is no isolated meaning. Meaning only becomes actual through relation — to a context, to a co-text, to a system, and to an interlocutor.

A word only means something because it enters into relation: with other words in the clause, with other clauses in the discourse, with the situation in which it is spoken. And these relations do not merely surround meaning — they constitute it.

Meaning is not an object in the mind but a structure of difference — a pattern of choices in a system that becomes real in context.

This is why meaning must be relationally semiotic. It cannot be located in a mind or encoded in a brain. It is the product of selections within systems — systems that are themselves relational configurations of possibility.

From Relation to Realisation

It is tempting to imagine that meanings exist somewhere, floating in the mind, waiting to be expressed. But meanings do not pre-exist their realisation. They come into being through the act of meaning — through the process of selecting features from systems and actualising them in context.

And because those systems are themselves formed through social interaction, meaning is always a shared phenomenon. Even our most private thoughts take shape in systems we did not create, using categories we inherited.

There is no isolated mind observing the world; there is only semiotic unfolding in relation — between strata, between speakers, and between potential and instance.

In this light, we no longer ask where the mind is. We ask how meaning is made — and we find consciousness not in a place, but in a pattern: the unfolding of systems in time, the movement of meanings across strata, the pulse of instantiation in context.


4 Consciousness Without a Self, Thought Without a Thinker

We are used to imagining thought as an action performed by a self — a thinker who observes, reflects, and decides. But if consciousness is a semiotic unfolding, as we’ve seen, then this "thinker" may be no more than a useful fiction. In this final part, we step fully into the implications of a relational semiotic ontology: there is no self behind thought, and no mind behind consciousness. There is only relation — enacted in language, instantiated in context, and stratified across semiotic planes.

The Illusion of the Interior

Western traditions have long placed the self at the centre of consciousness — a private, interior subject with privileged access to thought. But the relational ontology unravels this image. If every act of meaning is systemic, and every system is social, then what we call “interior” is already a product of shared semiotic history.

The inside is made from the outside: what feels like personal thought is the actualisation of cultural potential, through the individuated system of the speaker.

The self, then, is not the agent of thought but its outcome. It is what appears when systemic selections cohere in a recognisable pattern — a pattern that we narrate as identity, stabilised only through repetition.

Thought as a Phase in the Semiotic Flow

What, then, becomes of thought? If there is no thinker, does thought disappear? On the contrary, it becomes more visible — not as a hidden process within a mind, but as a visible unfolding across meaning systems.

Thought is not a possession. It is a phase in the unfolding of meaning: the projection of meaning from one stratum to another, or from one speaker to another.

It is this movement — from semantic potential to lexicogrammatical selection, from clause to clause, from instance to system — that constitutes the rhythm of thought. The “mind” is not thinking — meaning is happening, and the illusion of thought arises when we experience our place within that flow.

The Architecture of Unfolding

In SFL terms, we can think of consciousness as the dynamic organisation of system and instance, stratification and individuation. Each moment of experience is shaped not by an inner will, but by the semiotic engines of language and culture, which condition what can be meant — and by whom, and how.

To be conscious is to stand at the intersection of these engines: to find oneself actualising potential meaning, shaped by a history of prior instantiations, constrained by a system, animated by relation.

And thus:

  • There is no self who has thoughts. There is only thought as semiotic patterning.

  • There is no mind that observes the world. There is only the unfolding of meaning across systems of potential.

  • There is no consciousness as essence. There is only consciousness as process — as meaning made momentary and relational.


Epilogue: What Happens When We Mean

What happens when we mean?

We are not expressing a hidden self. We are not revealing inner truth. We are not transporting thoughts from one head to another.

We are entering a field — a field of potential meanings structured by culture, history, and the systems of language. And in that field, we are making selections: actualising potentials, configuring strata, and participating in patterns that stretch far beyond the instant.

To mean is to move. Not in physical space, but in semiotic space — across the cline from potential to instance, from system to realisation, from what could be said to what is said now.

And in that movement, there is no need for a central self. No interior agent. No metaphysical essence doing the meaning. Meaning happens relationally, in the encounter between speakers, systems, and situations.

The “self” is what appears when this process stabilises — when recurring configurations of meaning take on a patterned shape. The “mind” is the name we give to the unfolding of this process as it becomes conscious — but only because it folds back on itself, projects itself, and sees its own patterns reflected in the mirror of language.

We are not beings who mean.
We are becomings of meaning.

To rewrite consciousness, then, is not to redefine what a mind is, but to let go of the need for minds entirely — and to see instead the semiotic engines, the unfolding systems, the relational grounds from which meaning emerges.

And this is not a loss. It is a liberation: from the myth of the isolated self, from the illusion of mental privacy, from the Cartesian prison. It is an invitation to reimagine who we are — not as containers of meaning, but as moments in its ongoing flow.

30 June 2025

Semiotic Engines: Reconstructing the Architecture of Thought

1 A World Not of Things, But of Relations

We are used to imagining thought as something that occurs in the mind, as though it were a substance held within a vessel. But what if thought is not a substance at all? What if it is not even located in the mind? This series proposes a radical shift: to reconceive thought as a semiotic process, emergent not from brain matter alone, but from the relational architecture of meaning itself.

Our goal is not simply to describe how we think, but to reconstruct what thought is by attending to its semiotic conditions. And we begin with a foundational claim:

Thought is not a thing; it is a relation.

More precisely, thought is a phase in the actualisation of meaning potential. It is not the expression of a private interiority, but the dynamic interplay of signs across semiotic strata. The architecture of thought, then, is not built from neurons or ideas as such, but from semiotic relations: between system and instance, between speaker and situation, between what is potential and what becomes actualised.

In the history of philosophy, thought has often been framed in representational terms: as the mind's picture of the world. Even attempts to move beyond this framing, such as process philosophy or embodied cognition, often retain a substrate ontology beneath the process: there is still a "thing" doing the thinking.

Our relational ontology inverts this. It does not seek to ground thought in a substance or self, but in the structured potential of meaning systems. What we call "mind" is itself an emergent configuration of systemic relations. What we call "consciousness" is the instantial unfolding of those relations in context.

This is why we invoke the metaphor of the semiotic engine: not as a machine that produces thought, but as a dynamic system in which thought is a function of semiotic movement.

In the parts that follow, we will:

  • Unpack how SFL's clines of instantiation and individuation can reframe cognition.

  • Show how grammatical structures, far from merely expressing thought, enact its architecture.

  • Reinterpret common metaphysical categories (like mind, reason, or will) as frozen instances of semiotic processes.

We are not building a theory of thought; we are revealing that thought is itself a theory, made real in language.


2 Systems, Potentials, and the Machinery of Meaning

To understand thought as relational, we must start with how meaning itself is structured in a relational ontology. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) offers two crucial dimensions: instantiation and individuation.

Instantiation: From Potential to Instance

Every semiotic system is a structured potential for meaning. When we say something, we are not pulling meanings from an interior storehouse. We are actualising features of this system in relation to the situation. This process is instantiation.

An instance of meaning (a clause, a thought, a gesture) is not an isolated unit. It is a realisation of a selection from the system — a semantic act in context. Over time, repeated instantiations contribute to the shaping of what is likely to be instantiated again, subtly altering the system’s probabilistic architecture.

Thought, from this view, is never purely internal. A “private” idea is still a patterned semiotic act — a clause projected mentally, say — and it draws on shared systems. Even our most personal reflections are thus instantiations of culturally distributed meaning potential.

Individuation: From Shared Potential to Personal Repertoire

But people are not just passive reproducers of a collective system. As we engage in meaning-making across contexts, we develop a unique constellation of semiotic potential — a personal meaning repertoire. This is individuation.

Individuation is not the inheritance of a fixed set of categories. It is the ongoing relational differentiation of meaning potential within the field of culture. Our idiolects, personal styles, values, and habitual ways of meaning are shaped through social interaction — through the meanings we have access to, those we repeatedly instantiate, and those that are reinforced or marginalised.

In relational ontology, a self is not a bounded substance. It is an emergent pattern of individuation — a history of selections, variations, and resonances within a semiotic ecology. Where instantiation unfolds across situations, individuation unfolds across persons. Together, they make up the dynamic architecture of semiosis.

Thus, what we call "thought" is an instance of a system, enacted by an individuated repertoire, in a context of meaning relations. No mind is private. No idea is freestanding. All are phases in the ongoing, relational actualisation of meaning.

3 Grammar as Infrastructure

If thought is a function of semiotic movement, then grammar is not merely its expression — it is its infrastructure.

We often imagine grammar as a set of rules we follow to communicate ideas already formed in the mind. But from a relational perspective, this gets the process backwards. Grammar does not represent prior thought; it enacts thought, making it possible by organising meaning into form.

In systemic functional linguistics (SFL), grammar is not a code for translating ideas into language. It is the resource for meaning-making itself — a system of choices that configures experience into meaning. It does so not by labelling a pre-given world, but by constructing a world of relations: who does what to whom, when, how, why, and under what conditions.

Grammar is not a mirror of reality; it is a relational engine for construing it.

Consider the clause. In SFL, the clause is not a container for information but a configuration of functional roles: Processes, Participants, and Circumstances. These are not labels for ontological entities, but roles within a semiotic relation — relations that construct rather than reflect reality.

In this view, what we call a “thought” is an instance of clause structure being enacted. A mental clause nexus like “I believe it will rain” is not a window into an interior belief system. It is a grammatical construal that projects one clause (it will rain) through another (I believe), staging a relation between speaker, modality, and proposition. The very idea of belief is grammatical before it is psychological.

Grammatical metaphor extends this infrastructure further. Nominalisations like “freedom” or “consciousness” repackage processes as things, enabling us to build abstract domains — science, law, theology — atop reified semiotic relations. In doing so, grammar doesn’t just shape what we can say. It shapes what we can think.

The architecture of thought is grammatical — not because language limits thought, but because language enables it by providing the scaffolding of relations.

This is not to say that all thought is linguistic. But even non-verbal meaning — gesture, image — is structured semiotically. And in humans, it is language that makes thought reflexive: able to turn on itself, build models of itself, and evolve into theory.

So when we ask, “What is thought made of?” — we might answer: it is made of grammar, understood not as syntax, but as relational structure. Grammar is the infrastructure of the semiotic engine. It does not decorate cognition; it constructs it.


4 Reifying the Ghost — Mind, Will, and the Metaphysics of Meaning

If grammar is the infrastructure of thought, then metaphysics is what happens when we mistake that infrastructure for the world itself.

Western metaphysics is haunted by ghosts of its own making: mind, will, soul, consciousness — all reified abstractions, lifted from grammar and mistaken for substances. This isn’t merely a philosophical misstep; it’s a semiotic phenomenon. Our language doesn’t just enable us to construe these entities — it invites us to treat relations as things.

How? Through the grammatical process known as ideational grammatical metaphor: reconfiguring processes and relations as nominal entities. “I decide” becomes “my decision”; “I know” becomes “my knowledge.” This nominalisation enables abstraction, but it also obscures the relational nature of meaning. It reifies the process, freezing movement into object.

The “mind” is not a thing that thinks; it is the name we give to a pattern of semiotic activity construed grammatically as an entity.

This is not to deny experience. But when we say “I have a mind” or “my will is strong,” we are invoking metaphors with long histories of grammatical reification. The subject (“I”) is construed as possessor of an object (“mind,” “will”), as though selfhood were a container for inner things. In SFL terms, this is a relational clause construing an attributive relation — but mistaken for an ontological truth.

Here, the relational ontology offers a crucial corrective: there are no inner substances waiting to be accessed or explained. There are only semiotic processes unfolding in relation — across strata (from semantics to grammar to sound) and across instances (from social potential to individual expression). “Consciousness” is not a metaphysical constant but an instantial emergence: the unfolding of meaning potential through context.

This has powerful consequences for how we understand personhood, freedom, responsibility. If there is no ghost in the machine — no inner homunculus piloting thought — then what we call “will” is not an inner force but a socially instantiated pattern of meaning-making. And what we call “self” is not a metaphysical substance but a semiotic individuation, always becoming in relation.

We do not think because we have minds. We think because we inhabit — and are inhabited by — systems of meaning.

Rewriting these ghosts doesn’t dispel experience. It deepens it, releasing us from the illusion that meaning lives inside us, and allowing us to see that we live inside meaning.


Epilogue: Engines That Make Themselves

We began this series with a provocation: What if thought is not something we have, but something we do — or better yet, something that happens through us, as meaning is made actual?

Over four parts, we’ve unfolded a radical proposal: that thought is not a thing in the mind, but a relational actualisation of semiotic potential. Its architecture is not neural or metaphysical, but systemic and stratified — made of grammars, discourses, and contexts that precede and exceed the individual thinker.

To summarise:

  • In Part 1, we rejected the substance ontology of thought and replaced it with a relational view: thought as a phase in the unfolding of semiotic systems.

  • In Part 2, we explored how the clines of instantiation and individuation (from SFL) model the dynamic movement from potential to instance, and from collective to personal meaning — making thought both systemic and situated.

  • In Part 3, we examined grammar as infrastructure, showing how grammar doesn’t merely express thought, but constrains and enables its very form. Grammar is not a mirror of thought but one of its engines.

  • In Part 4, we exposed the metaphysical illusions born of grammatical reification — “mind,” “will,” and “self” — and offered a reframing: not inner substances, but semiotic constructs, instantiated in and through language.

So where does this leave us?

With a new kind of engine. Not one that sits in the skull or hides behind the eyes, but a semiotic engine: a self-organising system of meaning, where thought is not produced by us but produced with us — as we move through the systems that move through us.

We are not sovereign minds who deploy language; we are language systems that instantiate thought.

This is not a loss of agency. It is the recovery of a deeper one: not the illusion of control over meaning, but participation in a living system of meaning-making. We do not think in isolation. We instantiate thought in relation — to other speakers, to contexts, to histories, to potentials we did not choose but may yet transform.

In this view, consciousness is not the ghost in the machine. It is the engine that makes itself — not by magic or fiat, but through the patterned actualisation of semiotic potential.

And that is what it means to think:
To enter into relation,
To move across meaning,
To become, moment by moment,
An instance of the possible.

29 June 2025

When Grammar Pretends to Be God: A Relational Ontology Perspective

Introduction

This companion series to When Grammar Pretends to Be God deepens the critique by turning to ontology itself. It asks how grammar — specifically the grammar of the clause — has shaped not just what we say about the world, but what we believe the world is. Drawing on a relational ontology informed by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), we explore how grammar enacts a world of relations — and how Western metaphysics forgets this enactment, reifying those relations into things. God, force, consciousness — these are not pre-existing entities that language names, but interpretive relations that language actualises. When grammar forgets its own semiotic architecture, it performs a sleight of hand: a god trick. This series aims to expose that trick — and offer another way of thinking.

1 Relations, Reified

Western metaphysics has long mistaken its own language for the world.

The clause — that smallest unit of meaning which binds a Subject to a Process and a Complement — is not a mirror of reality. It is a semiotic act: a way of making meaning through relation. And meaning is how reality comes into being. The clause does not depict a world already there; it enacts a relation, and in doing so, actualises a world.

Yet across theologies and sciences alike, this grammatical architecture has been misread as ontology. Relations encoded by grammar have been mistaken for things that exist.

In Christian theology, the Subject becomes God-as-agent, the Process becomes divine action ("created," "redeemed"), and the Complement becomes the world — a patient, acted upon. But these roles are not ontological categories. They are functional meanings in a clause, projected into metaphysical space. The clause gives us not just God's Word, but God's grammar.

Science, too, inherits this scaffolding. Forces act. Energy flows. Laws govern. But what is "energy" apart from our need to assign agency in a transitive clause? What is a "law" but an interpersonal projection of obligation onto the cosmos? Even the Big Bang, the ultimate Process in cosmological grammar, is framed as if it had a Subject, a cause, and a trajectory.

Our relational ontology offers a different reading.

Instead of reifying Subject, Process, and Complement as existing entities, we read them as semantic functions — relational positions within a meaning instance. These roles do not reflect the architecture of the world. They enact a relation within the architecture of meaning.

And meaning is not a thing among things. It is potential — the structured readiness of a system to be actualised in relation. And when it is actualised, that is reality: not something described, but something enacted between speakers, strata, and systems.

This series will lay bare how Western thought has mistaken the architecture of language for the architecture of being. It will show that God, like gravity, may not be a substance at all — but a clause misunderstood.

The Word was not made flesh. The clause was made God.

And it's time we read it differently.

2 The Clause as the Lie That Tells the Truth

The clause is a marvellous fiction.

It construes a world of doing, sensing, being — a world in which agents act, things happen, events unfold. But this is not because the world is like that. It is because our grammar makes it like that. The clause tells a story of reality by fabricating relations between functions: Subject, Process, Complement. It is not the world's camera — it is its stage.

And what appears on this stage?

In transitivity, every clause is a little drama. A Process (e.g. creates, destroys, understands) is a happening or doing. It is relational, a semantic phase between participants. But Western metaphysics reinterprets these relational roles as entities: the Actor becomes an agent (e.g. "God"), the Goal becomes a patient (e.g. "the world"), and the Process becomes a force or power — as if these were parts of being rather than roles in meaning.

This is what our relational ontology seeks to reverse.

The Subject is not an entity, but a semantic function — an interpersonal role in the exchange of meaning. The Process is not a force, but an experiential relation. The Complement is not a substance, but another interpersonal role. These do not exist in the world before language. They exist in language as our way of construing the world — and in doing so, they actualise a world of kinds: agents, forces, causes, selves.

It is only when these relational functions are reified — frozen into ontological status — that grammar becomes metaphysics. We forget that "God created the heavens and the earth" is not a description but a construal — a construal with history, ideology, and theology woven into every function.

Our ontology reintroduces meaning as relational potential, not as categorical presence. In this model:

  • The clause is an instance of meaning — and meaning is how reality becomes actual.

  • The world construed by grammar is semiotic — and that is what being means.

  • Grammar enacts relation; it does not discover substance.

The so-called "lie" of the clause — that there are Subjects and Complements in the world — is also its truth. For by telling this lie, we do make meaning. We enact a shared world. But to believe that world precedes the meaning that brings it forth — to treat the clause as a report, not a relation — is to mistake enacted actuality for independent substance.

The clause is not fiction. It is formation.

3 Reification and the Ontology of the Frozen Relation

Grammar is not innocent. It does not simply name what is there — it brings it into being, and then forgets that it did so. This forgetting is what we call reification.

A relational function — like "Subject" or "Process" — becomes a thing, a substance, an entity. The clause enacts a semantic relation, but we read it as if it refers to a metaphysical reality. In this sleight of hand, grammar pretends to be God.

Let's take a familiar example:

Consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.

This clause enacts a relational Process ("is") linking two Participants — one Token ("consciousness"), one Value ("an emergent property of the brain"). In SFL terms, this is an identifying relational clause: it construes one meaning as being equivalent to another. But when read ontologically, it makes a much stronger claim — that "consciousness" is, as if it exists independently, out there, waiting to be found.

What our relational ontology reveals is this:

This clause doesn’t uncover a truth — it instantiates a relation. It’s not mapping the world; it’s making meaning. It is semiotic, not metaphysical. And once we see that, the implications are profound.

God exists is not a statement of ontology, but an identifying relation: it actualises a potential relation between a Subject and a Process.

The mind causes action is not the discovery of a causal agent, but the instantiation of a transitive clause structure: Actor – Process – Goal.

Time moves forward is not a metaphysical law, but a projection of temporal Process onto an abstract Participant.

Each is a clause. Each enacts a construal. And each has been reified — taken as a representation of what is. But when we treat these semiotic enactments as ontological realities, we confuse grammar for being.

The antidote is not to discard grammar, but to see it for what it is: a powerful engine of relational construal — not a mirror of a world, but a world-making tool. In this view, meaning does not refer to pre-given entities. It brings forth relational actualities. And metaphysics is the forgetting that we did this ourselves.

4 The Metaphysics of the Clause — And How to Undo It

When grammar pretends to be God, it pretends not just to mean but to be. It takes the fleeting, contingent nature of semiotic choice — and freezes it into ontology.

What enables this sleight of hand?

The clause.

In SFL, the clause is a figure — a quantum of meaning that construes experience in terms of processes and participants. It does not represent an objective world. It offers one way of construing meaning from potential: a snapshot of what is being meant now.

But from a Western metaphysical stance, the clause gets misread as a report of reality. It shifts from being an act of meaning to a statement of fact. From semiotic construal to metaphysical claim.

This happens most insidiously in relational clauses:

  • God is love.

  • Force is mass times acceleration.

  • Reality is language.

Each of these is structurally an identifying clause. Each equates two participant roles. And each, in philosophical hands, has been taken as a metaphysical truth.

But a relational ontology — informed by SFL — sees it differently:

  • These clauses instantiate meaning; they don’t discover it.

  • The copula is enacts a relation; it does not reveal a hidden essence.

  • The clause realises a semiotic relation, not an ontological identity.

This does not mean that such clauses are wrong. It means they are doing something different than metaphysics has assumed. They are not unveiling what exists. They are construing what means — in a particular context, through a particular semiotic system.

So what does it mean to undo the metaphysics of the clause?

It means returning to the clause as meaning in motion — not frozen truth. It means understanding that "God," "mind," "self," "reality" are not entities — but the names we give to dense knots of meaning, realised in semiotic relation. It means seeing that every clause is a move in meaning-making — not a mirror held up to the world. And it means recognising:

  • Grammar does not reflect being.

  • It enacts relation.

  • Only when we forget this, does grammar pretend to be God.

Epilogue: The World We Make With Grammar

We began with a provocation: that grammar pretends to be God. That, beneath the surface of metaphysical systems and ontological claims, lies a sleight of hand — a forgetting of how meaning is made.

Each part of this series has traced a path through that forgetting:

  • We saw how relational processes give rise to the illusion of substances — as if meaning were found, not made.

  • We examined how identities are not innate but enacted — instantiated in semiotic relation.

  • We uncovered how reification freezes relations into things — making thought look like the world.

  • And we reclaimed the clause itself as a unit of meaning, not of metaphysical fact.

At the heart of it all is a simple shift in perspective:

  • From things that exist to relations that are made.

  • From ontology as essence to ontology as instantiation.

  • From substance to actualisation.

This is not a retreat from reality — it is a shift in how we understand reality itself. For reality is not what lies behind meaning, but what comes into being through it.

What we call “the world” is not out there, waiting to be named. It is continually brought forth — actualised as meaning — through the dynamic interplay of systems in relation. Reality is not discovered; it is enacted. Not named, but made meaningful — again and again.

Grammar is not divine. But it is generative. It does not mirror the world. It makes worlds — worlds of meaning, of value, of relation.

When grammar pretends to be God, it forgets this. But when grammar is reclaimed as our own — as the architecture of meaning — we remember:

We are not prisoners of language. We are its participants. And the world it builds is not ours to reflect — it is ours to enact.

For meaning is not about things. Meaning is how things come to be.